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Introduction 
Establishing a context 
Problem of "financial bubbles" is not new in the history of mankind. The 
term "economy of a financial bubble" appeared in Asahi publishing house, 
originally it meant the processes in the Japanese economy in the late eighties 
(Moiseyev, 2005). "The financial bubble" is characterized by three components: 
price increase in financial assets, expansion of economic activity and continuous 
increase of money supply and credit. However, "financial bubbles" have a long 
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ABSTRACT 
The relevance of this research is caused by the need of strengthening a role of monetary 
regulators to prevent financial bubbles in the financial markets. The aim of the article is the 
analysis of a problem of crisis phenomena in the markets of financial assets owing to an 
inadequate growth of their cost, owing to subjective reasons. The leading approach to 
mechanism research of crisis phenomena in the market of financial assets is the approach 
based on a balance effect. Results: authors developed offers to prevent the crisis 
phenomena in the financial markets due to credit expansion. There is proved the necessity 
to develop a risk assessment system on existing and new financial instruments, with their 
obligatory application by commercial banks and rating agencies. The materials of the article 
can be useful at further studying the reasons for financial bubbles, development of actions 
for their prevention, and also in an educational process when studying certain subjects. 
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history. One of the first known "financial bubbles" was organized in France in 
1716 - 1720 (Moiseyev, 2005). The experience of 1716 - 1720 is remarkable that 
it was not just first "financial bubble", and for the first time it was a financial 
boom and monetary policy at the same time. 
 
Table 1. "Financial bubbles" in industrialized countries in 1980 – 2010. 
Country «Financial bubble» 
Australia (1989) Problems in the banking sector because of hopeless loans  
Great Britain (1990   – 
1991) 
The boom in the market of mortgage loans resulted in 
economic  recession and crisis of small and medium-sized 
banks 
The USA (1987 – 1991) Crisis of loan-and-savings institutions and collapse of "a 
financial bubble" in the stock market  
The USA (1999 – 2001) "Financial bubble" in the stock market of high technology 
Internet companies  
The USA (2007 – 2008) "Financial bubble" in the market of mortgage bonds 
The USA, all world (1979 – 
1982) 
Problems in the banking sector due to hopeless syndicated 
loans to the countries of "the third world"  
Sweden, Finland and 
Norway (1990 – 1992) 
The credit boom came to the end with bank crisis and  
decrease of real estate prices  
Japan (1989 – 1991) The boom in the stock market that is caused by price 
increase came to the end by the crisis of a financial system 
and it continues to the present moment 
The USA (2007 – 2008) "Financial bubble" in the market of mortgage bonds  
Source: Tikhonov Yu. A., Pudovkina O. E. & Bratukhina E. A. (2014). Economic research: 
condition analysis  and prospects for development. Chapter VII. The problem of "financial 
bubbles" in the context of monetary policy. Book 33. Voronezh: VSPU, 174-191. 
 
 
In modern economy globalization and development of the financial markets 
resulted in the fact that "financial bubbles" became an ordinary phenomenon. In 
1980 – 2010 there were financial booms in all leading industrialized countries, 
and in some countries there were some financial booms (tab. 1). Every time a 
"financial bubble", that blew up, had the most depressing consequences for a real 
production sector and a banking system.  
Literature review 
As the central bank is responsible for a bank system and many of these 
assets types, there is a question if it has to interfere and stop a financial boom in 
time. The traditional view of a problem is that monetary authorities should not 
react directly to the change in price on financial assets. There are several 
arguments: 
 prices on financial assets for a short-term period are too volatile, and 
they cannot serve as determinants of the monetary policy that is focused on a 
long-term result; 
 on the practical level it is almost impossible to find out whether the 
improvement of a situation in real production sector reflects increase in prices 
on financial assets, or it is just speculative mania; 
 even if the central bank will systematically react to prices fluctuation 
on financial assets, its actions will result in economic destabilization. 
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Followers of the regulation give two simple arguments in favor of an 
opposition policy to "financial bubbles". The first argument is based on the 
classical "Pool's analysis" (called by the name of U. Poole (1988), the former 
president of Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) that the central bank should 
"row against wind" at the revaluation of financial assets if the price increase has 
no basis. To the contrary, if the financial boom has origins in a real production 
sector, the central bank has to allow it to develop independently. U. Poole’s 
(1988) recommendations represent a typical example of the countercyclical 
economic policy that is designed to smooth fluctuations of market conditions. 
The second argument concerns time of intervention of monetary authorities 
in the market. It is known that the most destructive consequences of "a financial 
bubble" fall already on the post-peak period. When "the financial bubble" passed 
long ago, the government has problems with inflation and economic growth. To 
prevent such course of events, the central bank has to keep to countercyclical 
policy beforehand. In other words, it should interfere at an initial stage of 
growth of "a financial bubble". Then the subsequent correction in the financial 
market will be rather small, and losses of economy from the point of view of 
inflation and GDP are minimum. 
Opponents of the central bank worry that such policy will cause unfair 
behavior of investors. If the monetary authorities undertake to regulate "a 
financial bubble", then speculators will inflate it even more, hoping that their 
potential losses will be compensated by the authorities, now they are responsible 
for a financial boom. The problem of unfair behavior arises because of 
incoordinate actions of the central bank. It doesn’t usually react to quotations’ 
growth but to their falling. Partly such authorities’ behavior is justified by the 
fact that the market prices change asymmetrically: "bubble" is inflated slowly, 
and bursts quickly. However, if the central bank begins to react to rise and to 
fall in a similar way, then market dynamics can also change. Knowing that the 
monetary authorities will not allow excessive revaluation of assets and sharp 
fall in prices, quotations will change more smoothly, and investors will stop 
following a crowd blindly. Thus, the problem of unfair behavior of investors can 
be avoided if the central bank reacts symmetrically both to price growth, and to 
price falling. The main problem of countercyclical policy is the adequate 
assessment of price increase on financial assets (Davnism Kasatkin & Ardakov, 
2012; Davnis & Tinyakova, 2006), that is if the financial boom corresponds to 
the improvement of fundamental macroeconomic indicators or not. Many people, 
including G. Soros (2008), believe that investors are always biased, and in the 
boom period they assess a situation incorrectly. 
Establishing a research gap 
So far the theory and practice accumulated enough knowledge and 
experience to reconsider the point of view on "financial bubble". First of all, it is 
necessary to understand the nature of a financial boom. 
Increase in prices for financial assets can be both adequate, and irrational 
(Endovitsky & Bocharova, 2004). It is adequate when there is an improvement of 
a situation in a real production sector: increase in labor productivity, discoveries, 
excellent financial results, etc. If nothing similar happens, and the prices grow, 
the financial boom turns into "a financial bubble". The reasons for that can be a 
little: herd bias of investors (effect of crowd), imperfect regulation of the market, 
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financial liberalization, etc. However, the revaluation of financial assets is so 
dangerous for the economy. "The financial bubble" creates distortions in 
investments and consumption that at first leads to an economic boom and 
expansion of business activity, and then to recession and inflation. The 
intervention of monetary authorities can smooth these cycle fluctuations and 
reduce economy losses. 
How does the mechanism of "a financial bubble" work and why does it 
influence economic growth? Many economists believe that the financial boom 
increases households welfare and by that stimulates consumer expenses. For 
example, the growth of stock quotations in the USA stock market makes 
Americans richer therefore they begin to spend more. However, elementary 
econometric assessments revealed low correlation between share indexes and 
consumer expenses (Moiseyev, 2005). This fact is explained like this: income of 
households that is gained on share speculation goes to the pension savings 
which don’t influence operating costs in any way. 
More plausible explanation of "a financial bubble" is based on a balance 
effect. The change in price on financial assets is directly reflected on the 
balances of households, firms and financial intermediaries. Inflation of "a 
financial bubble" results in increase, and its collapse results in cost decrease of 
credits security. At the peak of a financial boom speculators use the credits for 
security speculation. When the trend changes the direction, leverage coefficients 
sharply jump up. From borrowers additional security is demanded, and increase 
in capitalization for compliance with the standards of capital sufficiency is 
demanded from banks (Egorov, Merkuryev & Chekmareva, 2009). Falling of 
quotations in the stock market worsens financial results and balances of all 
speculators that force them to reduce current costs. Expenses cover consumption 
not debts services. Redistribution of the income causes the reduction of 
aggregate demand and rates of economic growth. There is a spiral of debt 
deflation for the first time it was described by I. Fischer (1932, 1933) on the 
example of the Great depression. 
Financial instability causes financial bubbles which is immanent property 
of the financial system, according to some macroeconomists and financiers. 
Hypothesis sources that the economic system will not always be in an 
equilibrium condition, and can be shaken as a swing, are described in works of 
economists who were engaged in business cycles, in particular J. Schumpeter 
(1934) ("The theory of economic development") and J.M. Keynes (1936) ("The 
theory of employment, percent and money"). Among modern macroeconomists 
the most radical supporter of this idea is H.P. Minsky (1982), the author of a 
hypothesis of the financial instability that is developed in line with the ideas of 
famous above-mentioned economists of the past. 
H.P. Minsky (1982) defines a hypothesis of financial instability as the 
theory of debt influence and how it is generated, on behavior of an economic 
system. A key role in instability creation belongs to banks which, as well as any 
other economic agents, are interested in earning profit. Banks understand that 
best of all it is possible to earn on innovations and therefore try to introduce new 
products and regarding the obligations and assets which they get. As a result, 
dependence between quantity of money in economy and price level can be 
nonlinear. 
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We consider an operating credit mechanism in more detail as a formation 
factor of financial bubbles to define  possible directions of positive state 
intervention. 
Despite etymology of the concept "credit" as "trust" and excessive 
distribution of blank credits, the theory and practice of finance defines 
collateralization as a necessary element of crediting. Thus, the cost of pledge is a 
very important parameter for subsequent volume of crediting. Really, the higher 
the cost of potential security, the bigger volume of credit the businessman can 
count on. Cost ensuring (pledge) is particularly important at lombard crediting 
where the ratio between the credit sum and cost security is considered as a 
major factor at making decision on issuing a credit. 
In this principle of "security" of the credit there is the trigger mechanism of 
self-amplifying communication contour "asset cost – credit – asset cost" which 
leads to formation of "a financial bubble" (Baiding & Baydina, 2009; Endovitsky 
& Bocharova, 2004). 
For banks growth of security cost is a signal to crediting expansion and as a 
framework of operating credit lines under current pledges (their cost increased), 
and at the expense of new assets and their subsequent pledge. In turn, banks, 
using instruments of securitization, "pack" granted loans into securities to 
expand financing. Therefore secondary self-amplifying interrelation contour is 
formed: increase in credits - increase in volumes of securitization - increase in 
credits (Rachkevich & Alekseeva, 2008). 
Thus, the speed of formation of a financial bubble directly depends on the 
speed of credit expansion that is directed on certain assets acquisition. In turn, 
scales of credit expansion depend on the accepted ratio between security cost 
and credit size. 
We consider the role of the state in detail in bubble inflating or control 
through monetary management or policy of "investors support". Concerning the 
policy of bubble inflation control by means of monetary tools, the opinions of 
economists-theorists and experts regulators are the same. They agree that 
regulation of an interest rate will not help (Egorov, Merkuryev & Chekmareva, 
2009; Kindlberger & Aliber, 2010; Chirkova, 2010). However, the speed of 
formation of a financial bubble directly depends on the speed of the credit 
expansion directed to acquisition of certain assets. In turn, scales of credit 
expansion depend on the accepted ratio between security cost and credit size. 
Earlier credit crises led to toughening of regulation in relation to violators 
not to repeat it again. However, market fundamentalism that was dominating in 
Reagan times resulted in boomerang effect: banks in the USA have much 
freedom to decide who to give money. Practically all restrictions imposed on 
banks since the Great depression were gradually removed. It was allowed to 
banks to expand a branch network, to merge with banks from other states and to 
start new business directions. The distinction between investment and 
commercial banks became less noticeable, did not disappear absolutely yet. 
Sophisticated financial instruments and new ways not to show assets on balance 
accounts were invented. Exactly here there are the reasons of periodic 
emergence of "financial bubbles". 
New financial tools and technologies of trading and financing had one fatal 
shortcoming: they were based on the assumption that financial markets were 
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looking forward to balance. It was considered that temporary deviations have 
casual character, and values eventually reach a certain average. Securitization 
and other innovative tools enabled to redistribute risks. The more risks are 
distributed, the bigger risks can be accepted. New methods and tools were so 
sophisticated that regulating boards were not able to assess related risks. They 
had to use risk assessment methods developed by the organizations which 
created these tools. The existing international agreement on bank supervision 
Basel 2 allows large banks to rely only on their own systems of risks assessment 
(Soros, 2008).  Similar thing happened also to the rating agencies designed to 
estimate reliability of financial instruments. They had to rely on the calculations 
of authors of these tools. 
So, regulators refused to fulfill their obligations. Having relied on the 
calculations of risks that were made by market participants, regulators actually 
made a start and initiated uncontrollable credit expansion. In particular, the 
indicator of portfolio risks is calculated on the basis of the analysis of the past. 
In case of uncontrolled credit expansion the past cannot serve as an instruction 
to present assessment any more. 
Methods 
Research methods 
In the course of the research the following methods were used: theoretical 
(abstractions, analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction, and also methods of 
classification and generalization); methods of mathematical statistics and 
economic analysis. 
Scientific research base   
Scientific research base are works of domestic and foreign scientists 
theorists and practitioners on this subject. 
Investigation stages 
 The research of a problem was carried out in 2 steps. At the first stage 
existing scientific material by the nature of financial bubbles was collected and 
analyzed. The reasons are established causing their permanent emergence in 
developed economies of the world. The role of monetary regulators and monetary 
policy on the process of origin of financial bubbles and their development is 
defined. At the second stage recommendations on prevention of financial bubbles 
by means of measures of monetary policy and operations of monetary regulators 
were developed. 
Results and Discussions  
It is possible to formulate the following offers on prevention of "financial 
bubbles" due to credit expansion (Tikhonov, 2012): 
 introduction of legislatively established minimum discount to security 
regardless the quality at the level of 20% for a crisis stage and for an economy 
revival stage and of 95% in the “boom” period; concrete discount values in the 
“boom” period are defined by the regulator; at the same time there are current 
provisions connecting security cost and quality with the size of actual reserves 
on possible loan losses; 
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 it is expedient to determine the extreme sum of the blank loan granted 
to a borrower. The size of the specified sum has to depend on the legal status of a 
borrower; 
 at the subsequent pledge the loan is granted only on a difference 
between current security cost and a rest of a principal amount of a loan on 
earlier issued credits under this security; 
 development of a risk assessment system by the regulator on proposed 
financial instruments, with their obligatory application by commercial banks 
and rating agencies. 
It is the simplest way to limit credit expansion at the stage of active growth. 
Usually central banks react to the inflation connected with increase in prices or 
earnings, but do not try to prevent the inflation caused by assets growth, it is 
caused by uncontrollable credit expansion. 
Authorized institutions have to control not only the volume of money 
supply, but also processes of credit market formation, crediting terms. Money 
supply and credit do not track closely. It is necessary to care not only for an 
inflationary component of salaries, but also for the prevention of bubbles 
emergence connected with assets: the prices of assets depend not only on money 
availability, but also on a desire to credit. There is also a question: if it’s possible 
to use discount mechanism to security as one of the elements of credit activity 
regulation to prevent financial bubbles. Bank’s refusal from initial contribution 
of a borrower who is getting accommodation became one of the reasons of rapid 
growth of the real estate in the USA. 
Now the systems of bank regulation do not provide direct establishment of 
minimum discount to security when crediting both physical, and legal entities; 
moreover, so-called blank credits are not forbidden. It is possible to assume that 
lack of such direct regulating restrictions is connected with the principle of 
"rationality" of economic entities: a stable commercial bank cannot give 
unsecured loans, it is unjustified risk. However, modern economic reality 
displays that fierce competition, ambition to use a situation to get an excess 
profit, hidden or obvious signals of authorities, and securitization which is 
transferring risks to an investor – the buyer of securities, - all these things can 
result in a radical change of market behavior. 
It is impossible to claim that this aspect of bank activity is not regulated or 
controlled at all. In the Russian banking system security existence and quality is 
considered when forming reserves on possible loan losses. The relevant 
Provision of the Bank of Russia encourages banks to give secured credits, and 
quality of security directly influences formed reserve by establishing special 
correction coefficients. However, as the experience of developed countries and 
recent Russian experience of a mortgage boom, demonstrate, these instruments 
of positive stimulation (bigger and best security – smaller reserves, higher 
profit) are insufficient. 
Conclusion 
Thus "financial bubbles", especially of macroeconomic origin, are a huge 
danger. First, they seriously influence real sector, promote overheating in a real 
economy in a boom period. It results in distortions (branch imbalances) in the 
development of a real sector that inevitably leads to welfare loss in the long term 
(an example: "the dug investments"). Negative consequences of bubbles are also 
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that the real economy in the period of bubble crash shrinks even more, than in 
case of lack of a bubble, it occurs due to destabilization of a financial sector 
(more expensive borrowing, liquidity crisis, negative expectations). As an 
example, a dispersion of revaluation assessments of shares in the USA in 
August, 1929  vary from 0 to 50% whereas the collapse of the stock market in 
1929 - 1932 made 89% of peak share value. (Kindlberger & Aliber, 2010). The 
development of the situation went by the principle of the self-untwisted spiral: 
initial, rather small fall of shares caused reduction of real production, and, in 
turn, – further fall of shares, etc. The depression was overcome only from the 
beginning of World War II. 
At last, shrinking a bubble results in mass bankruptcies of the companies of 
real sector, banks, brokers, investors and speculators, both bulls, and bears. 
Accumulation is lost not only by speculators, but also unprotected segments of 
the population which didn’t take part in hysteria (for example investors of the 
pension funds). 
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